Interesting Aspects of Theories for Media and Communication Studies: Opportunities as Reflected in an Old Hidden Gem

HIDDEN GEM ONLY FOR SOME

To understand the unique position of this hidden gem, it’s worthwhile to contrast its relative obscurity within media studies compared to other disciplines. A citation analysis of the article reveals that, compared to cognate fields, it has been little attended to by our discipline. Cognate fields have embraced it, granting it a degree of minor celebrity and even some notoriety. Although the gem was conceived by a sociologist, it has found a home not only in the sociological literature but also in management, psychology, education, ethics, computer science and other literatures. It has been cited in over 1800 times and regularly appears on PhD course syllabi.

THE REVEAL

Now, let’s reveal the name of the hidden gem. The article I have been discussing is “That’s Interesting!: Towards a phenomenology of sociology and a sociology of phenomenology” by Murray S. Davis, published in 1971 in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences journal (Davis, 1971). Much like Broadway plays or Hollywood films, this article has garnered enthusiastic reviews. Sociologist Dan Ryan has called it a “cult classic” (Ryan, 2008, p. 15), and the late Joseph Gusfield, a leading figure in symbolic interactionism, described Murray Davis’s work as “some of sociology’s finest and most original studies of the way in which human beings structure and understand their experience” (Gusfield, 1996, p. 81). This praise carries particular weight considering Gusfield’s expertise in how people and institutions create meaning through symbols and signs, the very cornerstone of Davis’s approach and of course intimately connected with many media studies’ topics. [Author’s disclosure note: I was an enthusiastic student of Prof. Davis and afterwards we continued a collegial if distant relationship until his untimely death.]

We may next ask: what is the article’s argument that has provoked both ample praise and sharp criticism? The article’s enduring impact stems from its central argument: the interestingness, not the truthfulness, of a theory is what drives its influence and impact. Davis proposes that counterintuitive propositions that challenge our existing assumptions and offer surprising insights which disrupt our expectations are more likely to capture attention and spark further research. As you may recall, this scenario is what I tried to depict at the outset of this article.

In his article, Davis outlines specific criteria for “interestingness” based on principles of logical surprise and conceptual novelty. As he states:

It has long been thought that a theorist is considered great because his theories are true, but this is false. A theorist is considered great, not because his theories are true, but because they are interesting. Those who carefully and exhaustively verify trivial theories are soon forgotten; whereas those who cursorily and expediently verify interesting theories are long remembered. In fact, the truth of a theory has very little to do with its impact, for a theory can continue to be found interesting even though its truth is disputed – even refuted! (Davis, 1971, p. 309)

Expanding on this idea, Davis explains, “All interesting social theories, then, constitute an impact on the taken-for-granted world of their audience. This [theory] will consider any particular proposition to be ‘worth saying’ only if it denies the truth of some part of their routinely held assumption-ground. If it does not challenge but merely confirms one of their taken-for-granted beliefs, they will respond to it by rejecting its value while affirming its truth” (Davis, 1971, p. 311).

After examining the good number of social theories, Davis concludes that the interesting propositions could be resolved into the logical form: “‘What seems to be X is in reality non-X,’ or ‘What is accepted as X is actually non-X’” (Davis, 1971, p. 313). By drawing on several famous social science theories, Davis then shows how they could be reduced and analyzed through his analytical framework. I will provide three examples drawn from the array provided in his “Index of the Interesting.”

In terms of organization of social phenomena, Davis gives us the generalized form of interestingness in this domain: “What seems to be a disorganized (unstructured) phenomenon is in reality an organized (structured) phenomenon.” He illustrates the principle by pointing to Karl Marx’s assertion in Das Kapital that “the economic process of bourgeois society, which were considered at the time he wrote it to be organized in one way, are in fact not organized that way (but rather organized in another way)” (Davis, 1971, p. 313).

Using another example from his Index of the Interesting, we can reference his assertion that a theory will be deemed interesting if it can show that seemingly disparate phenomena are in reality various manifestations of a single unifying (if hidden) factor. Here he offers the case of Sigmund Freud and his psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious. Davis analyzes this theory as follows: Freud asserted that “the behavior of children, primitives, neurotics adults in crowds, as well as dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue and pen, which were considered at the time he wrote to be not associated in any way with one another, are in fact all the various manifestations of the same instinctual drives” (Davis, 1971, p. 315).

Davis also draws on media studies to provide yet another example of his theory of interestingness in action. One of his axioms of interestingness is in the proposition that things that are perceived as the same or at least quite similar are actually opposite phenomenon. He uses as his example here of Marshall McLuhan. Davis cites the success of McLuhan’s influential book, Understanding Media, to demonstrate this principle in action. Davis locates McLuhan in a specific historical era, the 1960s, when radio and television were seen as similar. McLuhan’s claim to fame is that he ostensibly showed that they are “in fact opposite media (one being a ‘hot’ medium; the other being a ‘cool’ medium)” (Davis, 1971, p. 325).

Remarkably in Davis’s view, theories do not need to be demonstrably true to attract attention and scholarly interest and may even have been debunked. In the case of the theories of Marx, Freud, and McLuhan they largely lack robust empirical support or accurate predictions. Yet, with each new generation these theories continue to have enduring appeal for their intellectual prominence, profound social consequences and provocative assertions. Or to use Davis’s terms, even though they are false, they are interesting. (Popperians, logicians, and critical rationalists, as well as adherents to the above theories, would object to the statements about truth, false and lack of verification. However, delving into the basis of their objections falls beyond the scope of this exploration of Davis’s argument.)

A crucial distinction in Davis’s approach is that while he offers a guide to “interestingness,” he never subordinates quality to it. Though intended as an analytical tool, this framework draws criticism for potentially undermining the central norm of scientific disinterestedness (Merton, 1973). Disinterestedness is a foundational norm of democratic scientific communities. It holds that scientists should be altruistic in their approach to research, driven by the pursuit of knowledge rather than personal gain. Accompanying this principle are behavioral traits such as modesty, lack of selfpromotion, and refraining from advertising one’s work. Davis agrees, asserting that “interestingness” should never compromise quality. He subtly accentuates the importance of upholding the norms of good scientific conduct without specifically mentioning Merton. Nonetheless, he still stands accused of providing a pathway to easy self-aggrandizement and thereby short-circuiting quality research and acting as a corrosive on the idealized scientific process. Or, to put it differently, his seeming cookbook to garnering attention for one’s work violates the norms specified by Merton.

In this brief overview, I have highlighted a few major points of Davis’s “sociology of the interesting.” However there is much more content and nuanced material in the body of the article, and space limitations preclude its recitation here. Still, it is worthwhile to close this review with Davis’s own summative words. He contends that “the ‘generation’ of interesting theories ought to be the object of as much attention as the ‘verification’ of insipid ones” (Davis, 1971, p. 344. emphasis in the original).

Interestingness, Media Studies, and Communication: The Road Ahead

Judging by citations, it appears that scholars of media studies have largely ignored (or at least have not stumbled upon) the contentions of Davis’s article, a situation that stands in stark contrast to cognate fields, especially management studies.

Looking a little more closely at impact, we can note that his article has also been prominent in organizational and management studies. Management professor László Tihanyi has called it “one of the most influential articles in management” (Tihanyi, 2020), and renowned management theorist Karl Weick made it the centerpiece for his article on theory construction (Weick, 1989).

Not everyone, however, shares this admiration. Professor Eric W. K. Tsang has called it “pernicious and corrosive,” whose article subtitle even decries its influence: “A flawed article has influenced generations of management researchers” (Tsang, 2022, p. 150). Tsang must have found plenty to object to, enough to dedicate an entire article to the subject (Tsang, 2022). Yet, even as he casts aspersions on the work, he offers a backhanded compliment by acknowledging its impact on “generations” of researchers. He is by no means alone in his criticisms, as others such as Foss and Klein (in press) have also engaged in critiques. It seems my chosen hidden gem has not resided in obscurity within cognate fields like management studies.

Considering the impressive success Davis’s article has enjoyed in management studies, it is worth asking what his “interestingness” theory could offer media and communication studies. Our field is particularly well-equipped to analyze and utilize this framework. In terms of analysis, we can ask how much communication theories gain traction due to their rhetorical effectiveness rather than their truth value. Regarding utilization, we can explore both fruitful and potentially problematic ways to use Davis’s Index of the Interesting to generate awareness of proposed advances, stimulate idea production through concept juxtaposition, and the effectiveness of “logical surprise” in provoking scholars’ curiosity in challenging theories. Ultimately, it would be worthwhile to see if such an approach proves particularly persuasive in communication research. Thus Davis’s concepts become both an object of investigation and a tool for theoretical innovations and their propagation through the field.